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Abstract—Stepping Stone Detection (SSD) can be used to 
trace back the real attacker in stepping-stone connection. 
Anomaly techniques are capable of identifying between normal 
and abnormal traffic. The collaboration of SSD and anomaly 
techniques enhanced the capability of detection of stepping-
stone connection. Several SSD approaches and anomaly 
techniques have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, 
we review these approaches and techniques. Furthermore, we 
suggest a potential future of anomaly techniques in SSD.  
 
Index Terms—Anomaly; Attack; Stepping-Stone Detection; 
Trace Back. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer attacks can be easily made without being close to 
the victim by sending the malicious code through the 
network. The attackers can be everywhere all around the 
world. To make it even worst, the attackers can use an 
intermediate host to channel their attacks. This kind of attack 
will take over control of the intermediate host (or called 
stepping stones) and launch the attacks. It will keep the 
anonymity of the attackers because it seems that the attacker 
is not directly involved. Attack from an adjacent host can be 
easily exposed the attacker but to trace back the route of the 
initial attacker from a chain of attack is going to be even hard 
and trickier [1].  
Figure 1 demonstrates how the initial attacker can get away 
from being detected. In this scenario, Host C is detected to be 
the attacker because the attack traffic from Host C is the 
visible traffic to the target host or the victim. Unfortunately, 
the real culprit has got away undetected. So, here is where 
SSD plays it role in detecting where the attack is really 
coming from. 
In this paper, we survey stepping stone detection (SSD) 
approaches for detecting connection-chains and anomaly 
techniques used in SSD that have been discussed in the 
literature. In general, SSD approaches can be divided into 
content-based, timing-based, deviation-based, watermark-
based and round-trip time-based (RTT).   
The remaining of the paper is outlined as follows. First, 
SSD is explained in section II and the approaches in section 
III. Then, anomaly techniques are discussed in section IV. 
Then, we look at SSD that applied anomaly techniques in 
their detection in section V. Finally, we conclude the paper 
and present promising direction in the last section. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Stepping stone scenario 
 
II. STEPPING STONE DETECTION (SSD) 
 
Connection chains refer to a set of connections where 
someone logs into one host and then keep on recursively log 
into another host and so forth [2]. The intermediate hosts in 
between the first host and the target host are called stepping 
stones [3]. It has become a great way for attackers to hide 
their activities and remain anonymous to the victims. The 
victims can only identify attacks coming from the last host in 
the connection chain while the real attacker hides behind the 
stepping stones.   
Figure 2 show Host A is the sender or the attacker, and Host 
E is the receiver or the victim. Host B, C and D are the 
intermediate nodes or stepping stones. Whereas connection a, 
b, c and d perform as the connection chain from Host A to E. 
Therefore, a stepping stone connection is detected when 
content in connection a = b = c = d. SSD is the process of 
tracing the initial attacker back to Host A.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Stepping stone connection 
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III. SSD APPROACHES 
 
During the past 25 years, an increasing amount of literature 
on SSD has been available. To date, various approaches have 
been developed and introduced to implement stepping-stone 
detections which are content-based, timing-based, deviation-
based, watermark-based and round-trip time-based (RTT) 
approaches. 
 
A. Content-based 
SSD was first shown or demonstrated by Staniford-Chen 
and Heberlein in 1995 [2]. At that time, they introduced 
thumbprint, a content-based technique to trace connection 
chains. Thumbprint works by looking at the similarity of 
content in two connections. Unfortunately, thumbprint fails 
to detect stepping stones if the content is encrypted or 
modified during the transmission. 
 
B. Timing-based 
In 2000, Zhang and Paxson [3] demonstrated the 
replacement for content-based with a timing-based approach 
of detection. They ignored the contents and used other 
characteristics such as timing and packet size to detect 
stepping stones. Stepping-stone connection can be detected 
by introducing a pattern of the ON/OFF condition in the 
transmission. The critical problem with this research is that if 
the attacker injects evasion techniques such as time jitter or 
chaff, the detection rate of stepping stone will be decreased.  
Initial ON/OFF algorithm [3] was improved by Kampasi et 
al. [4] by applying anomaly detection techniques. Three 
separate anomaly detection techniques were used to detect 
chaff and time jitter in stepping-stone connection. These three 
algorithms enhanced the existing timing-based approach. 
These algorithms worked in the presence of ‘magic numbers’ 
to conduct detection. However, authors failed to explain the 
computation nature and adjustment of that ‘magic numbers’. 
Controversy remains regarding how to create and use these 
numbers if we do not know how to tune them.  
In 2002, Wang et al. [5] published a paper in which they 
described a timing-based approach that correlates connection 
based on inter-packet delay (IPD) timing characteristics. A 
correlation between two flows is detected by looking at the 
similarity of connection generated by the IPD.  
The introduction of research using timing perturbation 
attack against timing-based correlation was first studied by 
Donoho et al. [6]. However, the study fails to show 
experimental results of the research. The study also fails to 
address other perturbation attacks such as chaff perturbation 
and the assessment of false positive and false negative rate of 
SSD. 
Later study after that considers the effect of perturbation 
attacks on SSD. By introducing the method of Detect-Attack 
(DA), Blum et al. [7] investigated numbers of chaff packets 
to avoid detection. Their work found that there is ‘upper 
bound’ of packets for detecting stepping stone. In another 
study by Zhang et al. [8], they demonstrated SSD in the 
introduction of timing delay and chaff perturbation 
simultaneously. However, they only managed to detect the 
case of chaff perturbation.  
He and Tong [9], [10] have developed a detection 
algorithm known as Detect-Match (DM). This algorithm 
takes account of detection without chaff packets. Perhaps the 
most contribution of this study is that DM reduced the 
complexity from exponential to linear of the result compared 
to DA [7]. 
The use of timing-based approaches by looking at the 
similarities in the incoming and outcoming stream is still 
considered the most capable and promising approaches till 
present time [1], [11], [12]. 
 
C. Deviation-based 
Research by Yoda and Etoh [13], is where deviation 
method was introduced. Deviation assumed if the size of 
bytes transferred grows gradually at the same rate, then that 
connection is a stepping-stone connection. However, this 
method has drawbacks. It cannot be used on compressed data 
because it is dependable on the size of the data. It is also 
making the detection after the end of connection because the 
correlation metrics were defined after entire connections 
complete [14].  
 
D. Watermark-based 
The study of watermark-based approach [15]–[19] 
suggested embedding code or watermark into the network 
traffic flow. If this watermark re-appears again in another 
traffic flow, the two connections belong to the same stepping-
stone connection. Watermark is actually created by 
modifying the inter-packet timing date in the traffic flow. The 
embedded watermark then can be recovered through 
detection process or can even be duplicated if it is improperly 
designed [20]. 
Peng et al. [21] studied the effects of chaff and limited 
perturbation using watermarking in the active timing-based 
algorithm. The algorithm injected the watermark into the 
upstream traffic and then detected the watermark in the 
downstream traffic. However, this method enables an attacker 
to counter back the detection because the detection process 
was exposed by the active intervention method. 
Pyun et al. [22] demonstrated probabilistic watermarking 
without being precisely synchronised. This study is actually 
an extension of research in [18] using re-packetisation. The 
duration of traffic flow was chunk into fixed-length intervals. 
It also does not have to be precisely synchronised between 
encoder and decoder as a previous probabilistic watermarking 
method. One major drawback of this method is the high cost 
of implementation compared to other methods. 
Wang and Reeves [23] introduced a novel watermarking 
method to detect stepping stones with the presence of timing 
perturbation. They managed to show theoretically that their 
method managed to detect almost 100 percent of True 
Positive Rate (TPR) and close to zero percent of False 
Positive Rate (FPR). However, this method needs a 
considerable amount of packet to do the detection. In 2012, 
Wang et al. [24] managed to demonstrate their Efficient 
Sequential Watermark Detection (ESWD) which 
experimentally reduced twenty-eight percent of packet 
needed for detection. Unfortunately, contradict from [23], 
their method was not robust against timing perturbation. 
 
E. Round Trip Time (RTT)-based 
The study on RTT was first carried out by Yung [25]. The 
idea of RTT is to find the length of the connection chain by 
comparing delayed acknowledgement gap and reply-echo 
gap. However, such explanation on calculating the length 
remains in doubt because the author simply multiplies the 
time by two that can be inaccurate.  
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Yang et al. [11], [26], [27] try to overcome the weakness of 
RTT in [25]. The authors computed the length by matching 
the ‘send’ and the corresponding ‘echo’ packet. They applied 
algorithms which determined the RTT-based on the changes 
of packet RTT.  Yang and Huang [28] published research on 
a Clustering-Partitioning algorithm using TCP/IP packets 
RTT to compute the length of a connection chain. Their 
experiment managed to detect stepping-stone intrusion when 
they can find the length. The primary issue of this method is 
that it is not efficient. Linear increases of the dataset will 
increase the timing in quadratic. Sheng et al. [29] introduced 
Computing Dataset X (CDA) to be used in Clustering-
Partitioning and able to lower the running time by decreasing 
the dataset. 
Ding and Huang [30], show another way of using RTT in 
SSD which called upstream RTT or uRTT. However, uRTT 
was not a better measurement of RTT because of its 
dependency on the subjective ability of human keystrokes 
which created different timing. The timing measurement of 
RTT is also not accurate because of the occurrence of 
crossover. Crossover occurred when the ‘echo’ from the first 
message still did not reach the host, another message has been 
sent. This research also tolerates as high as 15 percent of FPR. 
 
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
The anomaly-based technique is the process of analysing 
profile for normal traffic behaviour. The profile for ‘normal’ 
(legitimate) is first created to be the baseline. All new activity 
will be compared with the profile. Any deviation from the 
standard profile is called an anomaly. Most commonly used 
techniques for anomaly-based are statistical, machine 
learning, knowledge and data mining. 
 
A. Statistical-based 
Statistical-based techniques are based on capturing the 
activities of network traffic, and a profile of attack/normal 
behaviour is created. The profile is based on the number of 
packets, connection rates, transfer rates etc. 
In the process of anomaly detection, two datasets of traffic 
are analysed. The first dataset corresponds to current profile 
over time while the second one is the trained statistical profile 
that previously created.  An anomaly score will be 
approximated by comparing the two behaviours. The score 
points out abnormality of the specific event when the score 
exceeds a certain threshold.  
The first statistical technique was using univariate model 
[31]. The parameters are modelled as independent Gaussian 
variables. It defined every variable the values of the 
acceptable range. Ye et al. in 2002 [32] proposed multivariate 
models which consider the correlation of two or more metrics 
or parameter. It had been shown that better level of 
discrimination could be produced by combining related 
measures compared to individually.  
 Later, time series model [33] using interval timer with 
event counter/ resource measure was introduced.  It considers 
the inter-arrival times and order of the observation together 
with their values. The observed traffic will be treated as 
abnormal if, at the given time, the probability of occurrence 
is low. 
 
B. Machine Learning-based 
Machine learning-based techniques focused on 
constructing a model that adapt and improve performance 
based on it earlier results. It needs data with particular 
characteristics to train behavioural model. This procedure 
demands valuable resources. Several schemes of machine 
learning-based are discussed as follows. 
 
C. Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks code the probability relationship of 
variables of interest. Usually, it can be combined with a 
statistical scheme. It then will be capable of coding 
interdependencies between variables and predicting the 
event. However, the results from the Bayesian network are 
similar to threshold system, but with higher computational 
effort model [34]. 
 
D. Markov Model 
There are two approaches for Markov models which are 
Markov Chain and Hidden Markov. Markov Chain consists 
of a set of states which are interrelated through transition 
probabilistic. It defines the capabilities and topology of the 
model. In the first training phase, the probabilities are 
estimated from the normal behaviour of the target system. 
Anomalies were detected by comparing the anomaly score 
from the observed sequence with the fixed threshold. Hidden 
Markov is where the target system is assumed a Markov 
process where states and transition are hidden. Only 
productions are available to be observed [35], [36]. 
 
E. Neural Networks 
Neural networks simulate the human brain (neuron and 
synapses among them) in the anomaly detection. Neural 
networks offer adaptability and flexibility to environmental 
changes. It creates user profile [37], predicts next command 
from preceding activity [38], and identify attack from the 
traffic patterns [39]. However, neural networks do not 
provide an explanation why a particular detection decision 
has been taken [40]. 
 
F. Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is taken from the theory of fuzzy where 
reasoning is approximately deduced (rather than precise) 
from predicate logic. It is used in anomaly detection as the 
features to be accounted can be modelled as fuzzy variables 
[41]. The observation will be considered as normal when it 
lies within a given interval [42]. The main disadvantage of 
fuzzy logic is the use of high resource consumption. It is also 
rejected by most statisticians, and some engineers who stand 
for probability is the only description for uncertainty [40].  
 
G. Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic algorithms used other techniques of machine 
learning-based motivated by evolutionary biology. It capable 
of choosing parameters or features for detection [41] and 
derived classification rules [43]. The major setback of this 
technique is also the high consumption of resources. 
 
H. Clustering and Outlier Detection 
This technique creates clusters by grouping the observed 
data depending on distance or similarity measure. Then it will 
select a representative point in each cluster. Each data point 
belongs to a cluster depending on the proximity of the 
corresponding point [44]. Points that are not belonging to any 
clusters are called outliers or anomalies in the detection 
process. Clustering answered the question is the outlier an 
anomaly [45].  
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I. Knowledge-based 
Knowledge-based or also known as expert system 
classifies audit data using three steps involving a set of rules 
[40]. Firstly, classes and attributes are recognised from the 
trained data. Secondly, the procedures or parameters or 
classification rules are deduced. Finally, the data are 
accordingly classified. 
Specification-based methods are more restrictive. A human 
expert normally constructs the model. The experts determine 
the rules for legitimate behaviour to create a complete model. 
Furthermore, false positive will be reduced because it avoids 
the problems of legitimate activities being detected as 
intrusions.  A formal tool Finite State Machine (FSM) can 
also be used to develop a specification for anomaly model. 
FSM can provide a sequence of states and transitions for 
modelling network protocols [46].  
 
J. Data Mining 
Data mining technique is used to decrease the complexity 
of dataset rather than work as a detection scheme. Two most 
common of data mining techniques are Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and association rule discovery. 
A dataset becomes more complex and broad as different 
services or speed of the network propagates. PCA simplify 
the dataset. PCA makes a translation by ‘n’ correlated 
variables or ordered to reduce the number of variables ‘d’ so 
‘d<n’. This will facilitate detection process [47]. 
Association Rule Discovery workings by obtaining a 
correlation between different features from the datasets. For 
example, find an internal relationship between data, in a 
specific connection. Some algorithms of association rules are 
given in [48]. The term ‘data mining’ has been commonly 
applied for IDS processing whereas data mining is actually 
used to correlate network traffic instances in the database. 
Almost every anomaly detection techniques can apply data 
mining in dealing with huge databases [40].   
 
V. SSD USING ANOMALY TECHNIQUES 
 
Studies in applying anomaly techniques in SSD have only 
been done in a small number of research. Research by Yung 
in 2002 [25] had been renowned as the leading research in the 
extent of this area. The research [25] identified stepping 
stones based on the difference of ‘send’ packet with ‘echo’ 
packet. Unfortunately matching the packet of ‘send’ and 
‘echo’ can be imprecise if the traffic is encoded [49]. Yang et 
al. [11], [26] recommended analysing the traffic connections 
using anomaly techniques in real-time. Their study managed 
to disclose the result of step-function like that specified a 
stepping stone for each indicator of ‘jump’. One main issue 
in this study is they were established on RTT-based approach. 
RTT does not have a capability to estimate time of ‘send’ and 
‘echo’ accurately. 
Research by Giovanni et al. [50] and Kampasi et al. [4] 
suggested anomaly used for detection of chaff and jitter in 
network connections rather than detecting stepping stones. 
They established three anomaly algorithms to sense the 
presence of chaff and jitter in timing-based approach for 
enhanced detection.  
Huang and Kuo (2011) [51] established their anomaly for 
detection of chaff in stepping-stone detections. They have 
inferred the conclusion of identifying an attack in stepping-
stone connection by only detecting the existence of chaff in 
the internet connections. They believed if chaff is detected in 
the stepping-stone connection, then the connection is being 
part of the attack. Though, such explanations overlook the 
fact that they are other evasion techniques rather than chaff 
such as jitter and dropped packet [52]–[55] to distract the 
detection of stepping-stone connection. 
 
VI. FUTURE POTENTIAL OF ANOMALY TECHNIQUES IN 
SSD 
 
Previously, a study on SSD using anomaly techniques had 
little attention or do not consider on identifying the attack and 
legitimate traffic for stepping-stone connection. So far, earlier 
research applied anomaly to detect stepping stones [11], [25], 
[26]; to detect chaff and jitter in connections chain [4], [50]; 
and to detect chaff to verify the connection is attack 
connection [51].  
Next potential study can be focussing on identifying attack 
connections and legitimate connections. Preliminary research 
in SSD naturally assumed that all stepping-stone connections 
are attacks. Furthermore, every attack must be responded in 
an adequate way such as disconnecting the networks.  
However, not all stepping-stone connections are attacks 
[56], [57] and we may misleadingly respond to the false 
alarm. Some network traffic activities may seem like stepping 
stones but are not harmful. One example is given in [56] was 
automated polling systems. Wang et al. [15], demonstrated 
that Voice over IP (VoIP) could be traced as stepping-stones 
connections. It is very crucial to identify which are legitimate 
and which one attacks connections in detecting stepping 
stone. This will prevent legitimate users to suffer from 
wrongful responses by the system. 
In ensuring SSD can enhance identifying process between 
legitimate and attacks, anomaly detection techniques have to 
be integrated with the SSD. This is because anomaly 
technique is well known for their capability in categorising 
normal (legitimate) and abnormal (attacks). Hence, 
combining SSD with anomaly detection techniques will 
recognise the right connections to be responded rightfully. 
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this review, approaches in SSD have been classified in 
detecting stepping stone connections. Furthermore, we also 
reviewed techniques in anomaly which capable of identifying 
between normal or abnormal traffic. In parallel with the 
anomaly capacity to do classification, we conclude this paper 
by emphasising a possible directions SSD research. Looking 
at this review as an initial point, SSD can enhance their 
detection in identifying attack connection.  
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